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MOVING PAST A “POCKET CHANGE”
SETTLEMENT: THE THREAT OF
PREEMPTION AND HOW THE LOSS OF
CHANCE DOCTRINE CAN HELP NFL
CONCUSSION PLAINTIFFS PROVE
CAUSATION
John Guccione*
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 29, 2013, retired Judge Layn R. Phillips1
announced a “historic” $765 million settlement proposal between
the National Football League (“NFL” or the “League”) and over
4,500 retired football players.2 The plaintiffs, former NFL
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2015; B.A., SUNY College at
Geneseo, 2010. I would like to thank my wonderful parents, Tom and Karen
Guccione, as well as my friends and family for their amazing support. I also
wish to thank the members of the Journal of Law and Policy for their excellent
suggestions and generous sacrifices in time and energy. Special thanks to
Tiffany Colón, whose love and incredible encouragement, patience, and
kindness has made this note, and all else, possible for me.
1
On July 8, 2013, U.S. District Court Judge Anita B. Brody appointed
former federal prosecutor and federal judge, Layn R. Philips, as mediator to
settle claims between the NFL and thousands of former players. John P.
Martin, Judge Sends NFL Concussion Case to Mediation, PHILLY.COM (July
10, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-07-10/news/40471942_1_phillipsnfl-concussion-case-mediator.
2
The retired players who sued the league will be referred to as
“concussion plaintiffs,” “plaintiffs,” and “former players/athletes.” The
agreement is not final, as it is still pending the preliminary approval of Judge
Brody. The settlement specifically allocates $75 million for baseline medical
exams, $675 million for cognitive injury compensation, and $10 million for
research and education, along with monies for the costs of notice to the class,
settlement administrator compensation, and legal fees. Press Release,
Alternative Dispute Resolution Ctr., NFL, Retired Players Resolve
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athletes, accused the League of being aware of, and actively
concealing, evidence linking football to mild traumatic brain
injuries and their resulting “pathological and debilitating”
neurological effects.3 The plaintiffs alleged “intentional tortious
misconduct” by the NFL, “including fraud, intentional
misrepresentation, and negligence,” and sought “a declaration of
liability, injunctive relief, medical monitoring, and financial
compensation for the long-term chronic injuries” the plaintiffs
sustained during their NFL careers.4
Reactions to the proposed agreement varied greatly. For a
number of those closely involved in the litigation and settlement
process, there was an initial attitude of satisfaction on both sides.5
For example, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell remarked, “this
[settlement is] best for the game going forward,” and “best for
the players, and that’s what’s important.”6 NFL Executive Vice
President Jeffrey Pash reiterated the League’s apparent
commitment to the well-being of athletes and their families: “This
agreement lets us help those who need it most and continue our
work to make the game safer for current and future players.”7
Judge Phillips, who oversaw the parties’ negotiations, stated the
proposed settlement would ensure retired NFL athletes received
necessary financial support, at a time when they most needed it.8
On the players’ side, Kevin Turner, a former running back
and a lead plaintiff in the litigation, assured the public that the
Concussion Litigation (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter ADR Press Release].
3
Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint at 1,
In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa.
July 17, 2014) (MDL No. 12-md-2323) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Master
Complaint].
4
5

Id.
See, e.g., What People Are Saying, NFL CONCUSSION LITIG.,

http://www.nflconcussionmdl.org/what-people-are-saying/ (last visited Mar.
28, 2014) (listing testimonials of former NFL players, reporters, and legal
experts expressing relief and gratitude as a result of the NFL settlement).
6
Ian Begley, Roger Goodell Defends Settlement, ESPN (Sept. 4, 2013),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/9633728/roger-goodell-defends-765-millionconcussion-settlement.
7
ADR Press Release, supra note 2.
8

Id.
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benefits of the agreement would make a difference for thousands
of former athletes, both now and in the future.9 Christopher
Seeger, co-lead plaintiffs’ attorney, reiterated this message,
stating that the agreement “will get help quickly to the men who
suffered neurological injuries . . . [f]aster and at far less cost,
both financially and emotionally, than could have ever been
accomplished by continuing to litigate.”10
Despite such positive responses, other commentators and
former players expressed immediate dissatisfaction. A number of
experts and former NFL players spoke out against the settlement,
highlighting a number of terms that clearly favored the League.11
In addition, simply by settling (regardless of the final terms) the
NFL was afforded a number of protections they would have lost
had the litigation continued. For example, as with most
settlements, the proposed terms expressly articulated that the
agreement in no way represented an admission of liability on the
part of the NFL.12 Many commentators also noted that by
agreeing to settle, the NFL avoided an extremely damaging
discovery process.13 Should the case have moved forward,
plaintiffs’ counsel likely would have deposed the Leagues’ staff
and obtained access to internal documents and e-mails through the
9
10
11

Id.
Id.

Former running back Leroy Hoard, for example, expressed concern
regarding the fact that the second half of settlement monies are distributed over
a long 17-year period, while punter Chris Kluwe and former linebacker Aaron
Curry worried that the settlement, while helpful, would not provide sufficient
compensation. Reaction to the Concussion Deal, ESPN (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/9612672/reaction-nfl-concussion-settlement.
12
ADR Press Release, supra note 2.
13
See, e.g., LaMar C. Campbell, Opinion, NFL Concussion Settlement
Raises Questions, CNN (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/08/
opinion/campbell-nfl-lawsuit/ (“[T]he league does not have to face the
discovery and deposition process and therefore leaves many questions
unanswered.”); Daniel Engber, Opinion, NFL Concussion Settlement Doesn’t
Show Us How Dangerous Football Really Is, THE BUFFALO NEWS (Sept. 8,
2013), http://www.buffalonews.com/opinion/nfl-concussion-settlement-doesntshow-us-how-dangerous-football-really-is-20130908 (“[T]hey would have been
forced to put a huge library of internal documents on the record.”).
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discovery process, revealing exactly what the NFL knew and
allegedly concealed from players and the general public.14
Owners would have faced “continuing accusations of abusing
players,” as highly skilled and motivated plaintiffs’ counsel
would have conducted “nothing less than a strip search of NFL
records.”15 Escaping an admission of liability also meant the NFL
avoided one of the Plaintiffs’ key allegations: that the League
knew the dangers and risks of repeated concussions, that it
voluntarily undertook the responsibilities of studying NFL head
injuries, and ultimately concealed their long term effects.16 In the
words of former NFL Players Union President and Pro-Bowler,
Kevin Mawae, while the settlement was great for older players in
need of immediate help, it constituted “$700 million worth of
hush money that [the NFL] will never be accountable for.”17
Issues with the proposed settlement extend beyond the
League’s ability to avoid admitting liability and evade discovery
process disclosure. A number of critics have also expressed doubt
with regard to the adequacy of the underlying settlement amount,
going so far as to call it “barely a drop in the bucket.” 18 Indeed,
for an organization that currently generates approximately $9
billion a year in revenue, the $765 million settlement amount
reflects “less than half of what ESPN alone pays the League

14
15

See Campbell, supra note 13.
Lester Munson, Mediation Could Be the Answer, ESPN (July 9, 2013),

http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/9462264/questions-answers-judgedecision-send-nfl-concussion-lawsuit-mediation.
16
See Plaintiffs’ Master Complaint, supra note 3, at 23, 32.
17
Barry Wilner, NFL Concussion Settlement Draws Mixed Reactions
From Former Players, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/30/nfl-concussion-settlement-formerplayers_n_3845954.html.
18
Bill Barnwell, What You Need to Know About the NFL’s
$765 Million Concussion Settlement,
GRANTLAND (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://www.grantland.com/blog/the-triangle/post/_/id/72867/what-you-needto-know-about-the-nfls-765-million-concussion-settlement; See Arthur L.
Caplan & Lee H. Igel, What’s Unsettled About the NFL Concussion
Settlement, FORBES (Aug. 30, 2013, 6:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/leeigel/2013/08/30/whats-unsettled-about-the-nfl-concussions-settlement/.
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annually.”19 Some early commentators predicted that the suit
could be worth as much as $10 billion, assuming each injured
player and their family received an award of $500,000.20 In
January 2013, Paul M. Barrett of Businessweek hypothesized a
$5 billion agreement.21 Even the more grounded figures initially
sought by the plaintiffs were in excess of $2 billion; over 260%
more than the proposed settlement amount.22 As former
Minnesota Vikings player and current plaintiff Brent Boyd
lamented, “$765 Million? The breakdown is $1.2 million over 20
years per team. What is that, a third of the average salary? There
is no penalty there. It’s pocket change.”23
Presiding U.S. District Judge Anita Brody ultimately
validated these concerns on January 14, 2014 by refusing to grant
the settlement preliminary approval.24 Before the proposed class
action settlement agreement could take effect, Judge Brody had to
give her approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Patrick Hruby, Q&A: The NFL’s Concussion Deal, THE ROTATION
(Aug.
30,
2013),
http://therotation.sportsonearthblog.com/qa-the-nflsconcussion-deal/. In 2011, ESPN agreed to a deal extending through 2021
where the NFL would receive $1.9 billion a year in return for ESPN’s right to
broadcast mainly Monday Night Football. Richard Sandomir, ESPN Extends
Deal with NFL for $15 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/sports/football/espn-extends-deal-withnfl-for-15-billion.html.
20
See Glenn M. Wong, SN Concussion Report: NFL Could Lose
Billions in Player Lawsuits, SPORTING NEWS (Aug. 22, 2012),
http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl/story/2012-08-22/nfl-concussion-lawsuitsmoney-bankrupt-players-sue-head-injuries. This prediction was made when
only 3,000 former players were involved. Applying this $500,000 per player
award to the number of plaintiffs ultimately involved in the settlement would
result in even greater damages. See id.
21
Paul M. Barrett, Will Brain Injury Lawsuits Doom or Save the NFL?,
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/201301-31/will-brain-injury-lawsuits-doom-or-save-the-nfl.
22
Steve Fainaru & Mark Fainaru-Wada, Players Sought $2 Billion From
NFL, ESPN (Sept. 1, 2013), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/
id/9622926/players-initially-sought-2-billion-plus-nfl-concussion-settlement.
23
See Wilner, supra note 17.
24
In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708
(E.D. Pa. 2014).
19

2014.05.19 GUCCIONE.DOCX

5/19/2014 11:29 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

914

23(e).25 In class actions such as this, the court “must assure ‘to
the greatest extent possible that the actions are prosecuted on
behalf of the actual class members in a way that makes it fair to
bind their interests.’”26 Because class action settlements can bind
absent class members who did not participate in the litigation,
Rule 23(e) requires judges to ensure the agreement is “fair,
reasonable, and adequate” irrespective of the parties’ approval.27
While the Judge noted that Plaintiffs’ counsel “believed” the
aggregate sum of the settlement was sufficient based on “analysis
conducted by the independent economists or actuaries retained by
the parties,” she had concerns about the settlement’s “fairness,
reasonableness, and adequacy,” as such analyses were not
actually provided to the Court.28 Brody refused to grant
preliminary approval until documentary proof of the settlement’s
fairness was provided.29
Judge Brody also expressed concern that the funds would be
insufficient to compensate all class members who received a
“Qualifying Diagnosis” (such as dementia, Alzheimer’s, or
Parkinson’s Disease), resulting in the settlement’s largest
payouts.30 Brody noted that the settlement “contemplates a 65year lifespan,” and was expected to cover a class of around
20,000 individuals. She found it “difficult to see how the
Monetary Award Fund would have the funds available over its
lifespan to pay all claimants at these significant award levels.”31
As of April 2014, the settlement remains on hold.32
Given the apparent inadequacies of the proposed settlement,
and assuming that such amounts may not be increased in the
future, litigation may be the only way that former-NFL players
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); In re NFL, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 713–14.
In re NFL, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 713 (citation omitted).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
In re NFL, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 716.

Id.
Id. at 715.
Id.

Sam Farmer, Federal Judge Holds Off Decision on NFL Concussion
Settlement, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/sports/
32

sportsnow/la-sp-sn-nfl-concussions-20140416,0,579644.story.
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can be assured of an adequate remedy. However, there are
serious problems with the plaintiffs’ claims.33 First, plaintiffs
must be wary of the possibility that their claims will be
preempted by federal law, forcing them to be resolved through
arbitration pursuant to the NFL-NFL Players’ Association
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), rather than a court
proceeding. If the plaintiffs are forced to arbitrate, they lose the
benefit of a trial where potentially sympathetic jurors might favor
the many badly injured and allegedly misled plaintiffs, instead
facing a more neutral decision-maker less likely to award
significant damages.
Second, players must be able to prove causation—that is, that
the NFL caused their injuries. This is no easy task when some
athletes may already have had a predisposition to diseases like
Alzheimer’s, and may have sustained brain injuries in non-NFL
football activities, such as high school and college football, and in
their personal lives. To help resolve this issue, the courts and the
plaintiffs should look to extend the “loss of chance doctrine,”
traditionally applied only in medical malpractice lawsuits, 34 to
the NFL. The doctrine allows injured parties to recover damages
for the “reduction in odds of recovery” caused by a defendant’s
negative contributions, even if plaintiffs cannot show that the
alleged injuries were “caused in fact by the defendant’s

33

One such issue this Note will not discuss is class certification, which
has not occurred due to acceptance of the proposed settlement. Though NFL
athletes could still bring individual suits for their injuries, certification will
pose a major barrier for players, especially their medical monitoring claims.
Since “liability turns on the specific facts of each class member’s claimed
exposure,” and class members may not share identical risks of harm, some
argue such claims are not “indivisible,” and that class certification would be
denied. Sheila B. Scheuerman, The NFL Concussion Litigation: A Critical
Assessment of Class Certification, 8 FIU L. REV. 81, 105 (2012); see also
TIMOTHY LIAM EPSTEIN, SMITHAMUNDSEN LLC, NFL CONCUSSION CLASS
ACTION
LITIGATION,
available
at
http://www.dri.org/DRI/coursematerials/2012-AM/pdfs/39b_Epstein.pdf.
34
For a discussion of the “loss of chance doctrine,” see generally
Margaret T. Mangan, Comment, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: A Small Price
to Pay for Human Life, 42 S.D. L. REV. 279 (1997).
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negligence.”35 As long as an injured party can demonstrate that a
defendant’s actions lessened their ability to recover, the defendant
may be held liable for that reduction.36
Through the loss of chance doctrine, plaintiffs can argue that
despite possible neurological disease predispositions and brain
injuries arising outside of the NFL, the League conflated these
risks and should therefore be held liable for the plaintiffs’
resulting reduced changes of recovery. Given the unfavorable
terms of the proposed settlement37 and the risk it will ultimately
be rejected, an extension of loss of chance to nonmedical
malpractice torts (though it must be limited, and has its risks38)
provides a great opportunity for plaintiffs to succeed on their
merits and hold the NFL accountable.
Fortunately, even if Judge Brody ultimately approves the
settlement of In re National Football League Players’ Concussion
Injury Litigation,39 disgruntled plaintiffs will have an opportunity
to opt out.40 Although doing so would significantly delay
resolution of the opting-out plaintiff’s claims, those that can
afford to do so should strongly consider it, as they could continue
litigating along with former football players not currently
Andrew S. Kaufman, Determining Valuation in Loss of Chance Cases,
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 21, 2009, available at http://kbrlaw.com/kaufman3.pdf.
35

Id.
See, e.g., Steve Fainaru & Mark Fainaru-Wada, Some Players May Be
Out of NFL Deal, ESPN CHICAGO (Sept. 20, 2013), http://espn.go.com/
36
37

chicago/story/_/id/9690036/older-players-cut-nfl-settlement-concerns-growingwhether-enough-money-exists; Patrick Hruby, Don’t Settle, SPORTS ON EARTH
(Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/60617808/.
38
See generally David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance,
36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 605 (2001). One concern is that the doctrine, once
accepted widely, becomes difficult to limit and may “swallow” the traditional
more-likely-than-not rule. Id. at 606–07. If this happened, there are concerns
that all negligent actors could wrongly become liable for injuries they did not
cause but somewhat contributed to, an extremely uncertain determination in
many contexts.
39
In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708
(E.D. Pa. 2014).
40
Class Action Settlement Agreement at 59–61, In re NFL Players’
Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (MDL No. 12md-2323).
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involved in the lawsuit but interested in pursuing individual
claims. While threat of federal law compelling arbitration
pursuant to the CBA is possible, preemption should not apply
here. Additionally, while proving causation will be difficult, there
are methods available for the plaintiffs to do so, including
through a potential extension of the loss of chance doctrine.
Part II will discuss the adequacy of the proposed concussion
litigation settlement, specifically whether it provides sufficient
sums to compensate former players and provide for their medical
care, and how the uncertainties of litigation and the necessity for
immediate relief incentivized the plaintiffs to accept an
unfavorable settlement. Part III will discuss the threat of
preemption, and why it should not be applied to this case. Part IV
will discuss the issues inherent in proving causation and offer a
potential solution through judicial extension of the loss of chance
doctrine. Should NFL concussion plaintiffs pursue litigation,
avoid preemption, and prove causation, they will be able to hold
the NFL accountable for its actions, and may better assure
themselves and their families of fair compensation.
II. ISSUES OF TIMING
SETTLE

AND

CERTAINTY INDUCED PLAYERS

TO

A. Adequacy and Timing
The proposed settlement agreement has various components.
First, the NFL will provide $675 million over an extended period
to compensate former players for their injuries, with various
payments depending on the player’s individual diagnosis.41 For
example, the settlement awards a maximum of $3 million for
“moderate dementia,” $3.5 million for Alzheimer’s or
Parkinson’s Disease, $4 million for death with chronic traumatic
encephalopathy (CTE), a degenerative brain disease associated
with multiple concussions, and $5 million for amyotrophic lateral

Class Action Settlement Agreement, Exhibit B-5 at 6, In re NFL
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa. 2014)
(MDL No. 12-md-2323).
41
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sclerosis (ALS), or Lou Gehrig’s Disease.42 The NFL will also
provide an additional $75 million for medical testing, $10 million
for educational purposes, and $4 million for class notice costs.43
It also provides for over $110 million in attorney’s fees44 and an
additional $37.5 million contribution if the Settlement
Administrator determines the Injury Fund is inadequate.45
Settlement funds are expected to last for sixty-five years.46
Despite a proposed settlement that appears to include a large
amount of funds, there is good reason to support the doubts of
Judge Brody and a large number of journalists, experts, and
members of the class action. Though Christopher Seeger (lead cocounsel for the plaintiffs) made public assurances that
forthcoming reports from experts, economists, and actuaries
would confirm that the proposed settlement will be “sufficiently
funded,” some basic mathematics have brought that claim into
serious question.47 Judge Brody expressed concerns that the
settlement provides insufficient compensation if “even . . . only
10 percent” of retired players qualify for one of the tiers outlined
above.48 Indeed, enrollment numbers in prior NFL player injury
compensation programs have indicated that the number of players
with serious brain injuries may be high enough to quickly empty

42

These maximum awards are reduced if the former player played less
than five “Eligible Seasons,” and/or if the player was diagnosed after the age
of forty-five. Id. at 11–13.
43
ADR Press Release, supra note 2.
44
Sofia Pearson & Jef Feeley, NFL’s $914 Million Concussion Deal
Submitted for Approval, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2014-01-06/nfl-s-765-million-concussion-deal-submitted-forapproval.html.
45
Jason Lisk, NFL Reaches Proposed Settlement with Former Players in
Concussion Litigation, For Over $765 Million Plus Attorney’s Fees , THE BIG
LEAD (Aug. 29, 2013), http://thebiglead.com/2013/08/29/nfl-reachesproposed-settlement-with-former-players-in-concussion-litigation-for-over-765million-plus-attorneys-fees/.
46
Class Action Settlement Agreement, supra note 40, at 32.
47
Fainaru & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 37.
48
In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708, 715
(E.D. Pa. 2014).
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the fund.49
One such program is the NFL’s “88 Plan,” implemented in
2007.50 The 88 Plan is a program designed to provide nearly
$100,000 in yearly aid for the medical and custodial expenses of
qualified former players suffering specifically from dementia,
including “dementia due to head trauma.”51 The League designed
the 88 Plan partly in response to increasing media attention and
player complaints regarding the effects of concussions.52 Since
2007, 223 former NFL players have qualified for the program,
and the League has approved over $23 million in assistance.53 It
is likely many of these individuals would also qualify for the
proposed settlement’s larger payment tiers, which includes
awards of $3 million for dementia and $5 million for
Alzheimer’s,54 since the 88 Plan was specifically designed to aid
players diagnosed with dementia.
Patrick Hruby of Sports on Earth, an online sports blog, used
numbers from 88 Plan enrollment to argue against the adequacy
of the proposed settlement. He accounted for the 233 athletes that
qualified for the 88 Plan, and added to that number, thirty-four
former players who have already been diagnosed with CTE (a
disease not covered by the 88 Plan, but covered under the
See Patrick Hruby, Don’t Settle, SPORTS ON EARTH (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/60617808/.
50
Alan Schwartz, Before Dementia Assistance, Help With N.F.L.
Application, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
01/22/sports/football/22eckwood.html?_r=0.
51
The plan was named in honor of Hall of Famer John Mackey, who
wore the number 88 on his football jersey. NFL PLAYER 88 PLAN 4 (2007),
available at http://nflretired.baughweb.com/Resources/88%20Plan.pdf.
52
See Sally Jenkins & Rick Maese, Do No Harm: Who Should Bear the
Costs of Retired NFL Players’ Medical Bills?, WASH. POST (May 9, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/do-no-harm-who-should-bearthe-costs-of-retired-nfl-players-medical-bills/2013/05/09/2dae88ba-b70e-11e2b568-6917f6ac6d9d_story.html.
49

Id.
See Bruce Arthur, Former NFL Players Facing Costly, Unwinnable
Fight Over Concussion Settlement, NAT’L POST (Sept. 22, 2013),
53
54

http://sports.nationalpost.com/2013/09/22/former-nfl-players-facing-costlyunwinnable-fight-over-concussion-settlement/.
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settlement).55 He took the sum, 267, and multiplied it by an
average award of $2 million.56 The amount, $534 million,
accounts for a vast majority of the available funds, without
adding any newly diagnosed injuries whatsoever.57 In addition,
less than one third of retired NFL players were involved in the
concussion litigation at issue, but under the proposed settlement,
all retired NFL players would be eligible for this fund.58 It is also
possible that concussion-related, long-term injuries will only
increase as time goes on. Younger players have generally played
more football than their predecessors (from youth leagues to high
school and collegiate football), during a period where athletes
have generated greater impacts59 and commonly used painkillers
like Toradol,60 which may have exacerbated concussion harms.61
In other words, not only may there already be enough retired
NFL athletes to empty the settlement funds, but the number of
retired players with qualifying diagnoses will likely increase with
time.
The proposed settlement also has serious issues outside the
amount of overall compensation. Many seriously impaired
plaintiffs may not qualify for seven-figure awards, yet will need
or are already receiving nursing home care, where residence

55

Hruby, supra note 49.

56

Id.
Id.
Id. According to Hruby, there are between 15,000 and 18,000 living

57
58

retired NFL players. The concussion litigation here had around 4,600
plaintiffs. Id.
59
Michaeleen Doucleff & Adam Cole, Are NFL Football Hits Getting
Harder and More Dangerous?, NPR (Feb. 1, 2013, 12:02PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/01/31/170764982/are-nfl-football-hitsgetting-harder-and-more-dangerous.
60
Todarol, a painkiller with blood-thinning effects, was the subject of a
2011 lawsuit where players alleged that the drug’s ability to dull pain made it
more difficult for players to recognize concussion symptoms. See Ken Belson,
Ex-NFL Players Suing Over Use of Painkiller, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/sports/football/nfl-sued-by-ex-playersover-painkiller-toradol.html.
61
See Hruby, supra note 49.
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costs can average $80,000 per year—and often much more.62 The
proposed settlement also disqualifies awards for the families of
former players diagnosed with “football-related brain damage”
who died prior to 2006, precluding a number of wrongful death
suits.63
In addition, while the proposed settlement will take care of
some of the plaintiffs’ legal fees,64 many former athletes may still
have to pay significant portions of any awards to their attorneys.
Instead of fees being paid out of the settlement, dozens of
plaintiffs’ attorneys would collect fees directly from their clients
pursuant to previously negotiated agreements.65 This means not
only will some attorneys get as much as one-third of their clients’
settlement monies directly from the players, but they may be paid
twice, receiving a share of the League’s settlement fund as well.66
Nonetheless, Commissioner Goodell defended the proposed
settlement against such concerns about its inadequacy, attempting
to dispel the notion that the NFL could have afforded a higher
settlement. Goodell noted that despite the NFL grossing
approximately $10 billion per year, because “there’s a difference
between making (money) and revenue,” the settlement was best
for the plaintiffs and a “tremendous amount of money.”67 This
62

See Caplan & Igel, supra note 18.

Class Action Settlement Agreement, supra note 40, at 29. The NFL
hoped to bar all wrongful death claims from the settlement whose two-year
statute of limitations (typical for most states) had expired. While negotiations
extended the provisions to players dying after 2006, the families of those dying
prior to that year were not included. See Fainaru & Fainaru-Wada, supra note
37.
64
See ADR Press Release, supra note 2.
65
See Fainaru & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 37.
63

66

See id.

Begley, supra note 6 (alteration in original). Some, like Goodell, were
quick to evaluate the effectiveness of the settlement solely based on the dollar
amount, without reference to the staggering costs and debilitating injuries
sustained by former players. For example, on the day of the settlement
announcement, Sports Illustrated writer Peter King tweeted sarcastically: “I
love everyone calling $765m chump change.” Peter King, TWITTER (Aug. 29,
2013, 1:30PM), https://twitter.com/SI_PeterKing/status/373135592684396
544.
67
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argument was lampooned by Deadspin writer Reuben FischerBaum, who noted the League will generate approximately $180
billion in profits by the time the entire settlement is paid out to
the plaintiffs.68 The proposed settlement would account for only
0.425% of this projection.
Although the parties’ agreement raises serious questions,
some individuals have considered it a necessary evil. Many
commentators, former and current NFL athletes, and legal
experts examined the settlement from the players’ perspective,
and noted that while settling could cause the plaintiffs to lose
billions of dollars and an admission of liability, an agreement
assured the plaintiffs of both timeliness and certainty.69 As Brett
Romberg, an initial plaintiff in 2010, stated, although the NFL
“messed up in the past,” the $765 million “will be a muchneeded Band-Aid, especially for those who suffered injuries 20
and 30 years ago.”70
Timing was perhaps the paramount issue for the former
players with the most developed injuries and diseases.71 Kevin
Turner, a 44-year-old former running back suffering from ALS
or Lou Gehrig’s disease,72 stated that “[f]or those who are
Reuben Fischer-Baum, Infographic: The NFL’s Puny Concussion
Visualized, DEADSPIN (August 29, 2013, 4:14 PM),
http://deadspin.com/infographic-the-nfls-puny-concussion-settlement-visu1222822576. This is likely a conservative estimate, as it assumes the NFL
maintains, and will not exceed, its current profit levels.
69
See Patrick Rishe, Time, Certainty Explain Why NFL Players Settled
for Less in Concussion Lawsuit, FORBES (Sept. 4, 2013 1:34 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2013/09/04/time-certainty-explain-whynfl-players-settled-for-less-in-concussion-lawsuit/.
70
Romberg Supports Proposed NFL Deal, WINDSOR STAR (Aug. 30,
2013), http://www2.canada.com/windsorstar/news/story.html?id=30957b5d5fbc-41bd-9f27-f361a63626fd. Romberg eventually removed himself from the
litigation, and unretired in order to sign with the Atlanta Falcons in 2012. Id.
71
See Jim Litke, NFL Settlement a “Win-Win” for Everyone,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/column-nflsettlement-win-win-everyone (“The [settlement] benefits proposed are . . .
desperately needed. It won’t restore lives . . . nor heal broken minds . . . . But
it would provide help right away to generations of past players still suffering
the effects of concussion-related injuries.”).
72
ALS is a “progressive neurodegenerative disease that affects nerve cells
68

Settlement,
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hurting, this will bring comfort today . . . . The compensation in
this settlement will lift a huge burden off the men who are
suffering right now.”73 Indeed, the plaintiffs include former
players as old as eighty-four years old, many of whom played
less than three years in the League, some of whom never made it
on an NFL roster, and many of whom have been rendered
incapable of holding a job.74 These factors have created a large
class of individuals who have serious long-term injuries but little
money, placing a huge burden on these players and their
families.75 Mary Lee Kocourek, widow of Dave Kocourek—a
nine-year professional and four-time AFL All-Star—described the
hardships the couple faced less than a year before Dave passed
away.76 Doctors diagnosed Dave with dementia before his sixtyfifth birthday, and his condition deteriorated to the point that
Mary Lee had no choice but to place him in a nursing home.77
Although she received some financial help from the NFL, the
cost of nursing home care was close to $80,000 annually, while
Dave’s yearly salary as a professional never exceeded $35,000.78
By agreeing to settle with the NFL, the former players and
their families in the most need would receive immediate help,
in the brain and the spinal cord,” eventually leading to paralysis and death.
What is ALS?, ALS ASS’N, http://www.alsa.org/about-als/what-is-als.html.
One study showed that the risk of ALS and Alzheimer’s disease among
football players is between three and four times greater than that of the general
population. See Everett J. Lehman et al., Neurodegenerative Causes of Death
Among Retired National Football League Players, 79 NEUROLOGY 1 (2012).
73
Mike Jensen, Former Players React to NFL Concussion Settlement,
PHILLY.COM (Aug. 31, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-08-31/sports/
41622028_1_retired-players-nfl-chris-kluwe (emphasis added).
74
See Nathan Fenno, Many Ex-Redskins Among Those Suing NFL Over
Effects of Brain Injuries, WASH. TIMES (Jun. 20, 2012),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/20/price-of-pain-many-exredskins-among-those-suing-n.
75
See Melissa Segura, The Other Half of the Story, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(Sept. 10, 2012), http://si.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1205982/1/
index.htm.
76
77
78

Id.
Id.
Id.
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rather than waiting until litigation is resolved, possibly years
down the road. Rejecting settlement offers and proceeding with
the lawsuit could have easily delayed monetary aid to the
plaintiffs for at least another two years, given the complexities of
the suit, and possibly resulted in even less compensation.79 These
are people who need funds now. If Judge Brody eventually grants
preliminary approval, the decision will likely be appealed, which
will prevent class members from opting out of the settlement and
fully pursing their own claims until all appeals are fully
exhausted.80 Given these harsh realities, and the fact that the
terms of the current settlement require the NFL to pay
approximately fifty percent of the settlement amount over the next
three years, it is not surprising that many concussion litigation
plaintiffs support the proposed settlement.81 Though there is
substantial evidence that the current agreement is not the best
agreement that the plaintiffs could have achieved, it nonetheless
provides some immediate help to those suffering the most.

B. The Problem of Certainty
Certainty of the outcome of litigation was another major issue
for the players. If the plaintiffs do not receive any assistance from
the NFL, many will be unable to continue paying for their
medical care.82 The figures of the proposed settlement, despite its
inadequacies, at least guaranteed the plaintiffs some assistance
with medical bills. Paul D. Anderson, attorney and concussion
litigation expert, asserted that despite the settlement’s
shortcomings, “when balanced against the lives of many players
and families that are on the verge of bankruptcy and death, the
urgency is clear. Guaranteed money now is much better than no
Rishe, supra note 69.
Jacob Gershman, Concern Raised Over Opt-Out Terms of NFL
Concussion Settlement, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Jan. 28, 2014, 1:11 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/01/28/concern-raised-over-opt-out-terms-of-nflconcussion-settlement/.
81
The balance of the settlement would be paid over the subsequent
seventeen years. See ADR Press Release, supra note 2.
82
See Jenkins & Maese, supra note 52.
79
80
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money after years of litigation.”83 The settlement was partly
induced by fears that should the former players fail to settle, their
lawsuit could end in dismissal or a judgment for the NFL.84
Paramount among these fears was the issue of preemption by the
NFL-NFL Players’ Association (“NFLPA”) CBA, the challenges
of obtaining class certification, and the difficulty associated with
proving tort causation.
While avoiding preemption and proving causation will be
difficult, the apparent inadequacies of the proposed settlement
may make going to trial necessary, as litigation may be the only
route to ensure fair compensation.85 Subsequent examination of
the proposed terms indicate that while the settlement could lessen
the burden on those injured plaintiffs in the most need, many
others would not receive the security they envisioned and
deserve. In addition, further pursuing a lawsuit would allow for
discovery, disclose the NFL’s private information, and could
force the League to admit liability. Though the road is uncertain,
preemption should not affect the plaintiff’s claims, and increasing
medical evidence—along with a possible extension of the loss of
chance doctrine—could allow plaintiffs to succeed at trial.
III.

THE THREAT OF PREEMPTION

A. Section 301
If the plaintiffs did not agree to settle, they faced the
possibility that the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
Paul D. Anderson Consulting, LLC, Report: Judge Brody Threatened
to Dismiss the Heart of the Players’ Case, NFL CONCUSSION LITIG. (Sept. 3,
83

2013), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1508.
84
85

Id.

Attorney Paul Anderson expressed his extreme dissatisfaction with the
settlement—and no longer able to refrain from taking an active role in
concussion litigation—wrote that while the deal may be adequate for former
players currently suffering the worst symptoms, the settlement “falls well short
for the thousands of other players that are on the borderline.” Paul D.
Anderson Consulting, LLC, The Fight Must Go On, NFL CONCUSSION LITIG.
(Dec. 3, 2013), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1548. Anderson filed a
concussion lawsuit against the Kansas City Chiefs on December 3, 2013. Id.
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(“LMRA” or the “Taft-Harley Act”) would preempt their claims
against the NFL. In its memorandum in support of their motion to
dismiss dated August 30, 2012, the NFL focused on preemption
and section 301 of the LMRA.86 This section has been interpreted
to preempt all state law claims “the resolution of which is
substantially dependent upon or inextricably intertwined with the
interpretation of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement,
or that arise under the collective bargaining agreement.”87 The
NFL argued that the plaintiffs’ tort claims required the
interpretation of several terms in the CBA,88 and therefore, any
adjudication must take place pursuant to the CBA’s agreed-upon
grievance procedures. This would require arbitration, and thus
dismissal from federal court.89
Under section 301 of the LMRA, federal law governs any
lawsuit concerning a violation of a contract between an employer
and a labor organization (here, the NFLPA).90 Because it would
be an excessive burden to require bargaining parties to reach an
agreement that complies with the laws of all fifty states, section
301 seeks to ensure “uniform interpretation” of bargaining
agreements through the use of federal law.91 As Justice William
86

Memorandum of Law of Defendants National Football League and NFL
Properties LLC in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Master
Administrative Long-Form Complaint on Preemption Grounds at 14, In re
NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa. 2014),
2012 WL 3890252 [hereinafter Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss]. Section 301 is
codified as 29 U.S.C. §185(a) (2012).
87
Id. See also Lingle v. Norge Div. Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413
(1988); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209–10 (1985).
88
The NFL specifically referred to a number of CBA provisions it felt
required interpretation, including medical care provisions “relating to
assessment, diagnosis, and treatment of player injuries,” player rights and
obligations provisions including the ability to choose surgeons and obtain
second opinions, rule-making and player safety provisions in order to help
make the sport safer, and provisions discussing player benefits and grievance
procedures. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 86, at 12–15.
89
Id. at 14.
90
29 U.S.C. §185(a).
91
Nicole M. DeMuro, Reestablishing the Role of Arbitration in Labor
Law: Avoiding the Perils of Williams with the Rationale of Pyett , 21 SETON
HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 467, 474 (2011).
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Douglas made clear in Textile Workers Union of America v.
Lincoln Mills of Alabama, the purpose of section 301 was not
only to give federal courts jurisdiction over labor disputes, but to
evidence “a federal policy that federal courts should enforce
[collective bargaining] agreements . . . and that industrial peace
can best be obtained only in that way.”92 Should bargaining
parties agree to a dispute resolution provision in their CBA,
Congress intended it to be enforced: “Final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement.”93
Therefore, if resolution of a state law claim is “substantially
dependent upon analysis of the terms” of a labor contract between
the parties, it is preempted by federal law and may be dismissed
pursuant to the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. 94 Hence,
if plaintiffs’ dispute is “dependent on” or “intertwined with” the
NFL-NFLPA CBA’s provisions, it will be adjudicated pursuant
to the CBA, which compels arbitration.95 Resolution through
arbitration gives the NFL a distinct advantage: while plaintiffs in
employment disputes succeed in thirty-six percent of federal court
cases, only twenty-five percent of such plaintiffs succeed through
arbitration, with the average award being less than eighteen
percent of what prevailing receive on average from federal
courts.96 Arbitration also requires adjudication pursuant to
92

353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
29 U.S.C. §173 (2012).
94
Eric C. Surette et al., General Rule of Federal Preemption—“Section
301” Claims Under Labor Management Relations Act, 41 CAL. JUR. 3D
LABOR § 319 (2014) (citing Haney v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 17 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 336 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); see also Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v.
Verizon Cal., Inc.,133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Lujan v.
Southern California Gas Co., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)).
95
See generally 2011 NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, art.
43.
96
See Robert M. Sagerian, A Penalty Flag for Preemption: The NFL
93

Concussion Litigation, Tortious Fraud, and the Steel Curtain Defense of
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act , 35 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 229, 264 (2013).
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contract law, rather than tort law, making punitive damages (to
disincentivize the NFL from engaging in such conduct in the
future) unavailable.97 Finally, unlike a public trial, arbitration
pursuant to the NFL-NFLPA CBA must be confidential,
preventing the public from learning the specifics of the
proceeding.98
Before agreeing to settle, the plaintiffs were justifiably
concerned that their claims would be preempted. A news report
released on September 1, 2013, prior to the settlement agreement,
claimed presiding Judge Anita Brody “signaled” that she would
accept some part of the NFL’s preemption argument, and that the
“bulk” of the players’ case would be dismissed.99 In addition, the
NFL and its teams have often successfully argued for LMRA
preemption in the past.100 For example, in Givens v. Tennessee
Football Inc., former player David L. Givens sued his former
team, the Tennessee Titans, alleging bad faith in performing
contractual obligations, negligence, and outrageous conduct for
withholding important medical information regarding Given’s
knee.101 Ultimately, the Tennessee Titans successfully argued for
preemption, since Article XLIV of the CBA required team
physicians to advise a player of any conditions that could affect
their health or performance.102
In addition, in Stringer v. NFL, the court found the plaintiff’s
wrongful death claim was preempted after her husband, Pro Bowl
lineman Korey Stringer, died of heat stroke during training
camp.103 Although the court held that the plaintiff’s claim did not
97
98

Id. at 264–65.
Id. at 265–66.

Fainaru & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 22.
See Paul D. Anderson Consulting, LLC, The Almighty CBA, NFL
CONCUSSION LITIG. (Aug. 30, 2012), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=
1080; see also Stringer v. Nat’l Football League, 474 F. Supp. 2d 894 (S.D.
Ohio 2007) (holding the plaintiff widow’s wrongful death claim, where
plaintiff’s husband died from heat stroke, was preempted by section XLIV of
the CBA).
101
684 F. Supp. 2d 985, 988 (M.D. Tenn. 2010).
102
Id. at 990.
103
474 F. Supp. 2d 894, 915 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
99

100
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arise out of the CBA (which made no mention of preventing or
treating heat-related illnesses),104 the court did find that resolving
her claim was “substantially dependent” on the interpretation of
CBA Article XLIV’s team trainer and physician regulations.105
The plaintiffs in the current NFL lawsuit, to avoid
preemption, argued that the NFL owed them a duty of care
completely independent from the CBA.106 First, plaintiffs argued
that the NFL assumed the duty to act as a guardian of player
safety since the NFL’s inception in the 1920s, decades before the
first CBA.107 Additionally, the plaintiffs asserted that because the
CBA provisions cited by the League make no mention of the NFL
itself, “the duties they impose on teams are legally irrelevant to
the NFL’s separate duty to safeguard players from neurological
injuries.”108 Second, the plaintiffs argued that the NFL assumed a
duty of care based on its “unrivaled access to neurological-injury
data,” and its voluntary creation of a committee to “opine on the
risks of brain injuries in football.”109

B. The Failures of the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury
Committee
The “committee” the plaintiffs referred to was the Mild
Traumatic Brain Injury Committee (“MTBIC”). The League
formed the MTBIC in 1994 to study the effects of concussions
and brain injury in football.110 Dr. Elliot Pellman, a former New
York Jets team doctor and rheumatologist, was appointed chair of
the panel despite little experience in neurology (Pellman was not
104
105

Id.
Id. at 906, 911, 915.

106

Surreply of Plaintiffs in Response to Defendants National Football
League’s and NFL Properties LLC’s Reply Memorandum of Law in Further
Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Master Administrative Long-Form
Complaint at 1, In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d
708 (E.D. Pa. 2014) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Surreply].
107
108
109
110

Id.
Id.
Id.
Barrett, supra note 21.
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a neurologist) or the type of brain injuries at issue.111 He
remained chairman until he resigned in 2007,112 in large part
because of increasing controversy and negative press about his
tenure as chairman, including his troubling lack of expertise and
support of incorrect and misleading research that he conducted
and disseminated during his tenure.113
The details of Dr. Pellman’s incompetence and deception
border on the absurd. The New York Times reported that
Pellman had “exaggerated several aspects of his medical
education and professional status.”114 For example, Dr. Pellman
maintained he received his medical degree from SUNY Stony
Brook, when in reality he attended a school in Guadalajara,
Mexico.115 Further, Pellman claimed he was an associate clinical
professor, but was actually a non-teaching assistant.116 He also
purported to be a fellow of the American College of Physicians,
though he had not held the title for over six years.117 In addition
to questionable credentials, Dr. Pellman displayed questionable
judgment. It was, in the eyes of many experts and critics, very
troubling that the individual entrusted with the serious task of
studying mild traumatic brain injuries in order to ensure player
safety was attributed the following quote: “Concussions are part
of the profession, an occupational risk. [A football player is] like
a steelworker who goes up 100 stories, or a soldier.”118 Dr.
Pellman garnered little respect amongst his colleagues: “When
neuropsychologists sit around telling jokes, we call him ‘Mr.
Patrick Hruby, The Wrong Man for the Job, SPORTS ON EARTH (May
16, 2013), http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/47668524/.
112
Id.
113
Alan Schwartz, N.F.L. Doctor Quits Amid Research Doubt, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/01/sports/football/
01nfl.html.
111

114
115
116
117

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Michael Farber, The Worst Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 19,
1994), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1006087/2/
index.htm.
118
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Pellman.’”119 Another colleague told a reporter “I would hear him
say things in speeches like, ‘I don’t know much about
concussions, I learn from my players . . . .’”120
In addition, the scientific findings of MTBIC under Dr.
Pellman baffled many and garnered much criticism. In evaluating
numerous studies linking concussions to serious long-term harm,
“Pellman’s committee . . . repeatedly questioned and disagreed
with the findings of researchers who didn’t come from their own
injury group.”121 In compiling their own research, Dr. Pellman’s
studies “didn’t include results from hundreds of NFL players.”122
A troubling 2006 MTBIC study asserted:
[M]any NFL players can be safely allowed to
return to play on the day of the injury after
sustaining a mild [traumatic brain injury]. [T]here
were no adverse effects, and the results once again
are in sharp contrast to the recommendations in
published guidelines and the standard of practice of
most college and high school football team
physicians.123
In the words of an anonymous scientist who reviewed the
Committee’s work,
[t]hey’re basically trying to prepare a defense for
when one of these players sues . . . . They are
trying to say that what’s done in the NFL is okay
because in their studies, it doesn’t look like bad
things are happening from concussions. But the
studies are flawed beyond belief.124
After Dr. Pellman’s resignation, the NFL recast the MTBIC
as its “Head, Neck, and Spine Medical Committee” in 2010.125
Peter Keating, Doctor Yes, ESPN (Nov. 6, 2006), http://espn.go.com/
nfl/story/_/id/9793720/elliot-pellman-says-okay-play-nfl-suffering-concussion.
119

120
121
122

Id.
Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
Id.

Elliot J. Pellman & David C. Viano, Concussion in Professional
Football, 21 NEROSURGICAL FOCUS 1, 10 (2006).
124
Keating, supra note 119.
125
National Football League, NFL Names New Co-Chairs of Head, Neck
123
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The new members of this group, now headed by two
neurosurgeons, sought to distance themselves from Dr. Pellman’s
research. These new members made it very clear that “they
would not use any of the old committee’s data or ongoing studies
on helmets and retired players’ cognitive decline—all of which
had been overseen by Dr. Pellman and blasted by Congress as
‘infected’—because they didn’t want their ‘professional
reputations damaged,’” given the studies’ widely reported
inaccuracies.126

C. The NFL’s Arguments
The MTBIC’s failures, while appalling, now provide the basis
for the plaintiffs’ strongest argument against section 301
preemption. The plaintiffs’ counsel in the current NFL action
argue that the duty to prevent concussions and related brain
injuries is completely separate from the CBA. While the CBA
regulates a number of “health-related duties” associated with
NFL teams and team doctors, the plaintiffs argued that the CBA
does not impose any such duties on the NFL itself.127 Instead,
these duties are wholly independent of the CBA, and arose
voluntarily through the League’s creation of the MTBIC, its
involvement in concussion research, and its long history of
providing for player safety through rule changes and equipment
requirements in order to prevent injuries.128
However, the NFL maintained its stance that the CBA
preempted the plaintiffs’ claims, positing that CBA terms that
facially constrained only individual teams, actually applied to the
“League” itself as well. The NFL argued the plaintiffs could not
escape preemption by trying to make an “artificial” distinction
& Spine Medical Committee (Mar. 16, 2010, 4:21 PM), http://www.nfl.com/
news/story/09000d5d816fbbea/article/nfl-names-new-cochairs-of-head-neckspine-medical-committee.
126
Hruby, supra note 111.
127
Plaintiffs’ Surreply, supra note 106, at 7.
128
The plaintiffs referenced, for example, the League’s making helmets
mandatory in 1943, and making it illegal to strike at an opponent’s head, neck,
or face in 1980. Plaintiffs’ Master Complaint, supra note 3, at 14–19.
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between the NFL and its member clubs, as the NFL is simply an
“unincorporated association of 32 member clubs,” engaging in a
“joint enterprise” to organize and promote professional
football.”129 Essentially, the NFL argued that because the teams
and the larger league are essentially the same entity, CBA terms
that explicitly constrain only NFL teams are still applied to the
NFL as well, and are therefore not independent of the agreement.
The NFL also pointed to a number of CBA provisions it
believes preempted the former players’ claims.130 These included
several rule-making and safety provisions. For example, Article
50, section 1(a) of the 2011 CBA requires the maintenance of a
“Joint Committee on Player Safety and Welfare.”131 This Joint
Committee is tasked with discussing “player safety and welfare
relating to equipment, playing surfaces, stadium facilities, playing
rules, and more.”132 The NFL also referenced the CBA’s
grievance procedures—including a broad arbitration clause
requiring mediation of “all disputes involving the ‘interpretation
of, application of, or compliance with, any provision of’ the
CBA’s, player contracts, or any applicable provision of the
[League] Constitution.”133According to the NFL, the plaintiffs’
negligence, fraud, and misrepresentation claims “bear directly on
issues addressed by the CBA’s health and safety provisions,”
though such provisions do not mention concussions or brain
injuries explicitly.134 Therefore, the NFL argued that the
plaintiff’s claims should be preempted by federal law and
arbitrated.
The NFL referenced several key cases to support its
129

Reply Memorandum of Law of Defendants National Football League
and NFL Properties LLC in Further Support of Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint on Preemption
Grounds at 9–10, In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp.
2d 708 (E.D. Pa. 2014) [hereinafter Defendants’ Reply Memorandum].
130
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 86, at 7–8.
131
Id. at 9.
132
133

Id.
Id. at 10. This specific provision can be found at Article 50, §1(a) of

the 2011 CBA.
134
Id. at 16.
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preemption claims under section 301. In these lawsuits, courts
consistently held that the CBA preempted the plaintiffs’ claims.
In Duerson v. National Football League, Inc., the estate of
former Chicago Bears safety, David Duerson, brought a wrongful
death suit against the NFL.135 The plaintiff alleged that Duerson
committed suicide as a result of brain damage he sustained during
his playing career.136 In Duerson, the court held that the CBA
preempted the estate’s negligence claims.137 The court explained
that Article XLIV, section 1 of the 1993 CBA required club
physicians to advise players if their condition “could be
significantly aggravated by continued performance.”138 The court
explained that resolving the plaintiff’s claim required a
determination of whether the club, by allowing Duerson to return
to the field, “significantly aggravated” his injuries.139 Therefore,
the plaintiff’s claims were “substantially dependent” on the
interpretation of Article XLIV, implicating LMRA section 301
and requiring federal jurisdiction.140 The court additionally
hypothesized that other CBA provisions addressing player safety
may create a general “duty on the NFL’s clubs to monitor a
player’s health and fitness to continue to play football,” a duty
more than broad enough to include the plaintiff’s claims in
Duerson.141 The court further noted “preemption is still possible
even if the duty on which the claim is based arises independently
of the CBA, so long as resolution of the claim requires

135

No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012).
Id. at *1. Duerson suffered from the effects of CTE, including
“intense headaches, lack of short term memory, language difficulties, vision
trouble, and problems with impulse control.” Id. The plaintiff’s complaint
alleged counts of negligence, fraudulent concealment, conspiracy to publish
false information, and negligent failure to warn, against the NFL. Id.
137
Id. at *4.
136

138
139
140
141

Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at *6.
Id. Such provisions include those requiring each team to have a board-

certified orthopedic surgeon, requiring that the NFL pay for any medical care
rendered by club staff, and provisions regarding certification requirements for
trainers. Id.
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interpretation of the CBA.”142
The NFL also cited to the aforementioned decision in Stringer
v. National Football League.143 In Stringer, the widow of Korey
Stringer, a former Minnesota Vikings offensive lineman, filed a
five-count complaint against the League after Stringer died due to
complications from heat stroke and exhaustion.144 The plaintiff
argued that the NFL had no contractual duty to protect players
from heat-related illnesses, and that while individual teams were
responsible for their players’ health and safety, the NFL
voluntarily assumed the duty to “provide complete, current, and
competent information and directions to NFL athletic trainers,
physicians, and coaches about heat-related illnesses.”145 This duty
was assumed, Stringer argued, when the League issued a set of
“Hot Weather Guidelines” for the protection of players.146
Although the court agreed that the wrongful death claim did not
arise under the CBA, it accepted the NFL’s argument that the
CBA preempted Stringer’s wrongful death claim because
resolution of the claim was still “substantially dependent” on the
CBA.147 The district court found that “the degree of care owed by
the NFL in republishing the Hot Weather Guidelines . . . and
what was reasonable under the circumstances, must be considered
in light of pre-existing contractual duties imposed by the CBA on
the individual NFL clubs concerning the general health and safety
of the NFL players.”148 In deciding that Stringer’s claims were
“inextricably intertwined” with the CBA,149 the majority noted a
142
143

Id.
Id. at *5 (citing Stringer v. Nat’l Football League, 474 F. Supp. 2d

894 (S.D. Ohio 2007)).
144
Stringer, 474 F. Supp. at 898.
145
Id. at 905.
146
147

Id.
Id. at 908–09. More specifically, the court found the plaintiff’s claim

implicated CBA Art. XLIV §2, requiring the certification of training staff,
including instruction on how to “to prevent, recognize, and treat heat-related
illness, id. at 910., and Art. XLIV §1, requiring team physicians to inform
players if their physical condition “will be ‘significantly aggravated by
continued performance,’” id.
148
Id. at 910.
149
Id. at 908–09.
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CBA provision requiring team trainers to be “certified by the
National Athletic Trainers Association.”150 Since the “degree of
care” that the NFL owed by republishing the Hot Weather
Guidelines was dependent on whether or not team trainers were
educated on treating heat-related illnesses as part of the
certification process, the court decided the CBA must be
interpreted, and the plaintiff’s claims preempted.
The NFL also relied on Williams v. National Football
League, in which several players, including the plaintiffs, tested
positive for the banned diuretic bumetanide.151 The players, who
all testified they took StarCaps diet pills in order to control their
weight, also stated that they did not know the supplement
contained the banned diuretic.152 Plaintiffs argued that despite
warnings about supplements, a hotline that provided banned
substance information, and the League’s strict liability policy on
banned substances—the NFL owed a duty to the plaintiffs because
the NFL and its drug policy administrator knew StarCaps
contained bumetanide, yet failed to disclose it.153 Failure to advise
players of this fact, the plaintiffs argued, constituted a breach of
the League’s fiduciary duty to its players.154 Plaintiffs also
brought claims for negligence, gross negligence, and
misrepresentation against the League.
However, the court held that the CBA preempted each of the
players’ claims. Even though the players alleged that the duty to
provide “an ingredient-specific warning for StarCaps” arose not
under the CBA, but under Minnesota law, the court held that
whether the NFL owed this duty to the players “[could] not be
determined without examining the parties’ legal relationship and
expectations as established by the CBA . . . .”155 Further, the
court held that the CBA preempted plaintiffs’ misrepresentation
Id. at 910. The court also referenced Article XLIV, section 1, (the
provision at issue in Duerson) requiring team physicians to advise athletes if a
further game action would “significantly aggravate” the player’s injuries.
151
582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009).
152
Id. at 871.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 872.
155
Id. at 881.
150
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claims because “the question of whether the Players [could] show
that they reasonably relied on the lack of a warning that StarCaps
contained bumetanide cannot be ascertained apart from the terms
of the [League’s drug policy].”156 Finally, the court held that the
CBA also preempted plaintiffs’ claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, because determining whether the NFL
engaged in “outrageous” conduct required an evaluation of the
League’s drug policy, a part of the CBA.157

D. The Plaintiffs’ Arguments
The plaintiffs and the NFL differed substantially in their
interpretations of these key cases. In arguing their claims
shouldn’t be dismissed, the plaintiffs attempted to distinguish the
NFL’s precedent cases, including Duerson, Stringer, and
Williams.158 For example, the plaintiffs pointed to a key
difference between their lawsuit and Duerson. They argued that
unlike their own claims, the estate in Duerson never alleged that
the NFL, as a whole, assumed a duty of care independent from
that of the clubs and team doctors governed by the CBA.159 In
Duerson, the plaintiff barely referenced any duty assumed by the
League itself, only referring to a “generic duty ‘to keep [players]
reasonably safe.’”160 The current plaintiffs also highlighted the
NFL’s evasion of what the plaintiffs considered the “fundamental
flaw” of Duerson: that the court merely speculated that CBA
provisions might permit the League to exercise a lower standard
of care, without ever identifying an “actual dispute” over a CBA
term.161
The plaintiffs also attempted to distinguish the present case
from Stringer. First, they argued that unlike the present litigation,
the plaintiff in Stringer did not allege that the NFL misled
athletes, making that case inapplicable to the player’s fraud
156
157
158
159
160
161

Id. at 882.
Id.
Plaintiffs’ Surreply, supra note 106, at 20–25.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22–23 (emphasis added).
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claims here.162 Second, the plaintiff in Stringer alleged (arguably
to her detriment) that “[a]thletic trainers in the NFL serve as the
first line of treatment for players. It is their initial responsibility
to recognize and treat football-related injuries or conditions,
including heat-related illness.”163 Therefore, preemption was only
required in Stringer because Stringer’s claims referred
specifically to a breach of duty by team trainers, implicating the
CBA, which explicitly governs team medical staff.164 By contrast,
the plaintiffs argued, their concussion litigation sought to
establish a duty wholly independent from that of team medical
personnel.165 Therefore, no interpretation of the CBA would be
necessary to resolve their claims.
The concussion plaintiffs distinguished Williams based on
divergent facts. Their attorneys focused on the difference between
the “voluntary assumption of duty” on the part of the NFL and
the assumption at issue in the concussion litigation.166 As
previously mentioned,167 the current plaintiffs asserted that the
NFL assumed a duty of care to protect athletes from brain trauma
harm, arising from its historical assumption of duty for player
care and safety, and the NFL’s formation of the MTBIC in
1994.168 By contrast, in Williams, “the challenged steroid testing
regime was set forth in a comprehensive written ‘Policy’ that the
CBA ‘expressly incorporate[d].’”169 Because the NFL’s drug
policy was therefore part of the CBA, the CBA was obviously
implicated in resolving the plaintiffs’ claims, and preemption was
proper. In the present case, by contrast, the plaintiffs argued that
“the NFL identifie[d] no written policy specifically governing
head injuries, and certainly not one assigning responsibility for

162

Id. at 23.

163

474 F. Supp. 2d 894, 910 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
164
Plaintiffs’ Surreply, supra note 106, at 23.
165
166
167
168
169

Id.
Id. at 24.
See supra text accompanying notes 106–09.
Plaintiffs’ Surreply, supra note 106, at 6.
Id. at 24.
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those injuries to the NFL.”170
The NFL addressed many of the plaintiffs’ arguments,171 but
not what attorney Paul Anderson considered “the strongest theory
in the plaintiffs’ case”—that the creation of the MTBIC
Committee, to “spearhead concussion research,” represented an
independent assumption of duty by the NFL.172 Reviewing Third
Circuit precedent, Anderson concluded that the NFL did create
an independent duty through creation of the Committee, and
therefore, “the case law should have foreclosed the dismissal of
all negligence and fraud-based claims that relied upon the
[MTBIC’s] conduct.”173 Referencing the news report that Judge
Brody threatened to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims on preemption
grounds, Anderson asserted that such a decision would be “an
unpredictable shocker,” and hypothesized that the rumor’s source
might have been “jockeying for a settlement in an attempt to
counter the public’s perception that this deal was lousy.”174
Federal precedent supports Anderson’s position: that the
plaintiffs’ claims cannot be preempted by the CBA since the NFL
assumed a duty of care through the MTBIC. In Trans Penn Wax
Corp. v. McCandless, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that section 301 of the LMRA did not preempt the plaintiff’s
claims.175 The plaintiffs, former employees of Trans Penn, were
given a written “contract” (separate from the parties’ CBA) by
their employer guaranteeing their jobs, but were subsequently
fired less than a year later.176 The court held that the plaintiff’s
claims were not preempted because they never alleged a violation
of duties assumed specifically in the CBA.177 The court reached
the same conclusion in Kline v. Security Guards, Inc.,178 noting
that the fact that the CBA was simply related to the plaintiff’s
170

Id. at 25.

171

Defendants’ Reply Memorandum, supra note 129, at 15–18.
Paul D. Anderson Consulting, supra note 83.

172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Id.
Id.
50 F.3d 217, 233 (3d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 221.
Id. at 232.
386 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2004).
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claims was not sufficient for the court to find preemption.179
There, the plaintiff employees alleged their employer’s
surveillance practices, including the use of microphones to record
oral communications, amounted to several torts including
invasion of privacy.180 Judge Stapleton asserted that “the mere
fact that we must look at the CBA in order to determine that it is
silent on any issue relevant to Appellants’ state claims does not
mean that we have ‘interpreted’ the CBA” for Section 301
purposes.181 Noting that the CBA did not mention the terms at
issue (e.g., “surveillance,” “video cameras,” or “microphones”),
the court found that no “interpretation” of the CBA was
necessary to adjudicate plaintiffs’ claims.182
On May 14, 2014, the In re National Football League
Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation plaintiffs received welcome
news that at least one District Court judge accepted similar
arguments against section 301 preemption.183 Judge Catherine D.
Perry remanded Green, et al. v. Arizona Cardinals Football
Club, LLC, a suit brought by three former players (and their
spouses) against their former team, to state court, finding that
“the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims can be evaluated without
interpreting [the 1977 or 1982 CBAs]….”184 Judge Perry found
the bargaining agreements did not bear on negligence claims
“premised upon the common law duties to maintain a safe
working environment, not to expose employees to unreasonable
risks of harm, and to warn employees about the existence of
dangers of which they could not reasonably be expected to be
aware.”185 Similarly, Judge Perry noted that the players’ negligent
Id. at 256.
Id. at 250. The employer alleged these claims were preempted by CBA
clauses relating to “management rights” and “shop rules.” Id. at 257.
181
Id. at 256.
182
Id. at 259.
183
Paul D. Anderson Consulting, LLC, Court Rejects NFL Team’s
Preemption Argument, NFL CONCUSSION LITIG. (May 14, 2014),
179
180

http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1635.
184
Green v. Ariz. Cardinals Football Club, LLC, No. 4:14-cv-00461CDP, 2014 WL 1920468, at *1–2 (E.D. Mo. May 14, 2014).
185
Id. at *10.
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misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment claims could be
resolved without CBA interpretation, as they arose from common
law duties of an employer “‘to inform himself of those matters of
scientific knowledge’ that relate to the hazards of his business,
and relay that knowledge to his employees.”186 Judge Perry’s
decision may have enormous effects on the future of In re
National Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation.
As one journalist noted, “[t]he outcome [of Green] also could
result in the plaintiffs in the settled case to quit trying to persuade
Judge Anita Brody to approve the settlement, opting instead to
proceed with the litigation. If the players in that case secure the
same victory Roy Green and others have realized in Missouri, the
value of the claims would potentially skyrocket.”187
Since the NFL has assumed a general duty to protect its
athletes, and more specifically a duty to warn them of the risks of
neurological injury (through its formation of the MTBIC), the
plaintiffs’ claims should not be preempted. As in Kline, the NFLNFLPA CBA makes no mention of the specific duty at issue. Just
as terms like “surveillance” or “microphones” were not
mentioned in the Kline CBA, discussion of concussions or brain
injuries do not appear in the NFL-NFLPA CBA with any
reference to the NFL itself, only to issues relating to team
doctors.188 Though the plaintiff’s claims in Stringer openly arose
out of team duties to their athletes, the plaintiffs here look to the
NFL itself. While the players’ claims may relate to the CBA
terms the NFL highlighted (such as the creation of the Joint
Committee on Player Safety and Welfare), such terms do not
require interpretation to resolve the claims. This distinguishes the
present litigation from Williams, where the drug policy at issue
was expressly incorporated into the collective bargaining
agreement. The CBA’s arbitration clause only applies to disputes
186

Id. at *16.

Mike Florio, NFL Suffers Major Setback in Concussion Cases, NBC
PROFOOTBALLTALK (May 14, 2014, 9:28 PM), http://profootballtalk.
nbcsports.com/2014/05/14/nfl-suffers-major-setback-in-concussion-case/.
188
See generally NFL-NFL Player’s Assoc. Collective Bargaining
Agreement (Aug. 4, 2011), available at https://www.nflplayers.com/Aboutus/CBA-Download/.
187
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involving the CBA, player contracts, and the League
Constitution. And as in Trans Penn Wax Corp., none of the
plaintiffs’ claims refer to explicit duties in the bargaining
agreement. None of the CBA clauses proffered by the NFL189
relate specifically to a League concussion policy. Therefore,
LMRA section 301 should not apply.
IV. PROVING CAUSATION AND THE LOSS OF CHANCE DOCTRINE

A. Causation Issues: Tobacco Litigation, Team Trainers,
Assumption of Risk and Contributory Negligence
Even if concussion litigation plaintiffs avoid preemption, they
must still prove causation in order to successfully prove
negligence. This requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that the “head
[injuries] players sustained while playing in the NFL” directly
caused the plaintiffs’ current health problems.190 It may be
extremely difficult for plaintiffs to show that the game of
professional football caused long-term cognitive injuries,
especially where high school or collegiate-level athletics, nonfootball activities, genetics, and diet also play a large role in the
incidence of these diseases.191
In order to prove causation, some scholars have drawn
parallels between the concussion litigation and big-tobacco
lawsuits.192 Both the NFL and the tobacco industry sought to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 86, at 7–9.
Scott Fujita, Mixed Feelings Over NFL Concussion Settlement, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/sports/
football/mixed-feelings-over-nfl-concussions-settlement.html.
191
Michael McCann, Examining What Happens Next in the Concussion
Lawsuit
Settlement,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
(Aug.
29,
2013),
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/nfl/news/20130829/what-happens-next-in-nflconcussion-lawsuit-settlement/.
192
This idea gained traction after a 2009 congressional hearing was
conducted to evaluate the League’s concussion policy. There, Representative
Linda Sanchez of California “analogized the denial of a causal link between
NFL concussions and cognitive decline to the tobacco industry’s denial of the
link between cigarette consumption and ill health effects.” Joseph Hanna &
Daniel Kain, The NFL’s Shaky Concussion Policy Exposes the League to
189
190
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discredit growing scientific data indicating a causal link to longterm illness and formed research committees to “refute the
mounting evidence load that protected the vitality of their
products.”193 Despite the attractiveness of using big-tobacco
litigation as a framework for pursing concussion lawsuits against
the NFL, some do not believe it is an apt comparison. Attorney
Joseph Hanna succinctly explained the problem with comparing
the tobacco litigation and the former players’ concussion claims:
[U]nlike tobacco use, the effect of individual
concussions on a football player remains unclear.
Further, the NFL retains medical personnel who
are employed specifically to detect and prevent
player injuries, whereas smoker plaintiffs were
given no such attention. Lastly, because NFL
players could have sustained permanent mental
injuries at any point in their career (high school,
college, etc.), proving the causal chain—i.e., that
the NFL’s failure to warn resulted in injury—is
difficult at best.194
Although statistical evidence linking concussions to long-term
disease such as CTE is becoming increasingly overwhelming,195
Potential Liability Headaches, 21 ENT., ARTS & SPORTS L.J., no. 3,
Fall/Winter 2010, at 33, 34.
193
Daniel Kain, Note, “It’s Just a Concussion:” The National Football

League’s Denial of a Causal Link Between Multiple Concussions and LaterLife Cognitive Decline, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 697, 717–18 (2009).
194
Joseph M. Hanna, Paying the Piper: NFL’s Concussion Policy Results
in Huge Class Action Lawsuit, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Aug.
15, 2012), available at http://www.mosessport.com/Paying_the_Piper__NFL_s_Concussion_Policy_Results_in_Huge_Class_Action_Lawsuit.pdf .
195
For example, Dr. Ann McKee has studied the brains of at least fortysix former NFL players has found CTE in forty-five of them. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, when asked to speak about her research in front of the MTBIC
in 2009, Dr. McKee was allegedly confronted with aggressive questioning and
mocking interruptions, especially from committee co-chair Ira Casson.
Transcript, League of Denial: The NFL’s Concussion Crisis , FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sports/league-of-denial/transcript50/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2014); see also Mark Fainaru-Wada & Steve
Fainaru, League of Denial, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (October 7, 2013),
http://sportsillustrated.asia/vault/article/magazine/MAG1208801/index.htm.
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proving causation would require the NFL to answer questions
avoided by the proposed settlement; including exactly what the
NFL knew about the long-term effects of football-related brain
injuries, when they knew it,196 and whether they deliberately
spread misinformation or remained willfully blind to the problem.
Without this information, the NFL cannot be held accountable.
Fortunately for the plaintiffs, there is already ample evidence that
the NFL ignored or dismissed mounting evidence linking
concussions to neurological damage.197 In 1994, NFL
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue responded to concerns over
concussions by stating “the number [of concussions] is relatively
small . . . . [T]he problem is a journalist issue.”198 Further, the
Pellman-lead MTBIC asserted that “[r]eturn to play does not
involve a significant risk of a second injury either in the same
game or during the season,” and argued that individuals “prone
to delayed or poor recovery after MTBI” are actually “selected
out” of organized football, and never reach the NFL.199 The NFL
also rejected the American Academy of Neurology’s 1997 returnto-play guidelines, including the suggestion that concussed
players not return to the field until being symptom-free for at
least a week.200 In addition, MTBIC co-chair Ira Casson’s famous
2007 “no, no, no” denial when asked about any link between
football and depression, dementia, Alzheimer’s, or other longterm problems, further evidences that the League at least turned a
blind eye to the problem.201 It may be nearly impossible to show
196
197

See Campbell, supra note 13.
See generally Lauren Ezell, Timeline: The NFL’s Concussion Crisis,

FRONTLINE (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sports/
league-of-denial/timeline-the-nfls-concussion-crisis/.
198
199
200

Id.
Id.

MTBIC doctors criticized the guidelines as not being supported by
ample research, stating, “[W]e see people all the time that get knocked out
briefly and have no symptoms.” James C. McKinley Jr., Invisible Injury: A
Special Report; A Perplexing Foe Takes an Awful Toll, N.Y. TIMES (May 12,
2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/12/sports/invisible-injury-a-specialreport-a-perplexing-foe-takes-an-awful-toll.html.
201
Bernard Goldberg conducted the interview in 2007. REAL SPORTS
WITH BRYANT GUMBEL (HBO May 14, 2007). Ira Casson – No, No, No,
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that the NFL alone caused the plaintiffs’ injuries, but mounting
evidence suggests that it did spread misinformation, failed to
disclosure unpopular data, and relied on poor science. This, when
coupled with the NFL’s strong denial of any causal links between
playing football and long-term brain injuries, indicates that the
NFL prevented players from making informed decisions about
their heath and contributed to the prevalence of such harm.
Importantly, the fact that NFL teams retain physicians does
not mean that the League is not responsible for plaintiff’s
injuries. While NFL teams do retain medical personnel “to detect
and prevent player injury,” the physicians’ efforts do not
preclude a finding that the League caused the litigation plaintiffs’
injuries, due to the doctors’ inherent conflicts of interest.202 This
conflict of interest exists because both trainers and doctors are
paid by team management and thus they face pressure to return
athletes to the field as soon as possible, hoping to keep their
employer happy and retain their title as an “official” team
medical provider or physician group.203 Although the NFL added
independent neurological consultants to the sidelines in 2013,204
this does not solve all the problems associated with concussion
diagnoses, and obviously does little to help the retired players
comprising the plaintiffs in the current lawsuit. Some players do
not show immediate symptoms, making an on-scene neurologist
ineffective.205 Also, typical sideline chaos can cause a breakdown
in protocol, and players tend to refuse to leave the game.206
Evidence, therefore, suggests that team trainers and physicians
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4NbU_HaB3Y (last visited
May 3, 2014).
202
Kain, supra note 188, at 728–29.
203
Id. at 708–09.
204
Curtis Crabtree, NFL Will Have Independent Neurological Consultants
on Sidelines Next Season, NBC PROFOOTBALLTALK (Jan. 31, 2013,
4:10 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/01/31/nfl-will-haveindependent-neurological-consultants-on-sidelines-next-season/.
205
Dom Cosentino, Why the NFL’s New Concussion Protocols Aren’t
Working, DEADSPIN (Oct. 3, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://deadspin.com/why-thenfls-new-concussion-protocols-arent-working-1437228632.
206
Id.
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were not particularly effective at handling and treating injuries
arising from concessions.
Two of the most potent defenses that the NFL would likely
raise are assumption of risk and contributory negligence.207 Such
defenses arise out of the belief that many football players, despite
knowing that they risk injury or further injury, still “tough it out”
on the field and fail to be honest with their team’s trainers and
physicians. However, it is not clear that the NFL would be
successful. In order to raise assumption of risk as a defense, the
plaintiffs must, “knowing . . . the risk and appreciating its
quality, voluntarily [choose] to confront it.”208 If plaintiffs
voluntarily place themselves in harm’s way, despite the risks,
they cannot later claim negligence if they are injured. Given the
deliberate misinformation provided by the MTBIC, and the
potential existence of data and information allegedly withheld by
the NFL, proving athletes had “actual knowledge” of the risks
that arose from concussions would be difficult to prove.209 In
other words, while it is reasonable to argue that football players
assume the risk of being concussed, it will be challenging for the
NFL to argue players actually knew how these concussions would
ultimately affect them, even if a substantial number of athletes
may have tried to play through their injury regardless.
Contributory negligence may provide a better defense for the
League.210 In 2007, the NFL distributed a pamphlet to players
giving players the burden of notifying team doctors and trainers
of possible concussion symptoms, and advising that players
should not return until they are entirely free of symptoms.211
However, it appears that many players have ignored this advice,
likely contributing to their risk of long-term injury.212 The NFL
207
208

See Wong, supra note 20.

Dan B. Dobbs et al., THE LAW OF TORTS §235 (2d ed. 2000).
See Hanna & Kain, supra note 187, at 11.
210
See id. at 11–12.
211
See National Football League, NFL Outlines for Players Steps Taken
to Address Concussions, NFL.COM (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.nfl.com/
news/story/09000d5d8017cc67/article/nfl-outlines-for-players-steps-taken-toaddress-concussions.
212
See Howard Fendrich, NFL Concussions: Some Players Still Willing
209
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has a long history of lauding “toughness” and the ability to play
through injury, where if a player left a game with a “slight
concussion,” they weren’t “giving it all” for their team.213 For
example, quarterback Peyton Manning admitted to intentionally
underperforming on baseline concussion tests in order to lower
his return-to-play standards.214 By lowering his baseline, Manning
hoped to return from concussions earlier than recommended, as
he might later be able to meet his baseline after an injury, even if
he were still suffering the concussion’s effects. Though some
players may not have acted in the best interests of their health,
this behavior cannot be viewed in a vacuum and should not affect
the outcome of concussion litigation. It would be difficult for the
NFL to prove that many of the plaintiffs hid concussive injuries,
and it is likely that many players concealing brain injuries would
not have done so absent the League’s deliberately cultivated
“tough-it-out” culture and frequent minimization of concussion
risks.
In addition, there is considerable incentive for NFL players to
play down their own injuries. NFL contracts are not guaranteed
beyond the season in which an injury occurs if the player cannot
pass his team physical before the subsequent season, and football
players can be terminated at-will if the team decides another
player would increase team performance.215 In order to keep their
jobs then, many players do not reveal if they are suffering from
any concussion symptoms.216 Furthermore, even if players report
their symptoms, those players are still under significant pressure
to return before becoming completely asymptomatic in order to
to

Hide Head Injuries, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 26,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/26/nfl-concussions-hideinjuries_n_1169861.html.
213

2011),

Id.

Rick Reilley, Talking Football with Archie, Peyton, Eli, ESPN (Apr.
27, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=6430211.
215
Kain, supra note 187, at 710–11.
216
For example, linebacker Dan Morgan, who had endured a number of
concussions and missed significant playing time, restructured his contract
bonus in order to remain on the Carolina Panthers through a calculation based
on number of games played. Hanna & Kain, supra note 186, at 12.
214
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stay in their club and coach’s good graces, and retain their roster
position.217
Faced with these systemic issues, and the lack of information
and misinformation provided by the League to its athletes, it is
unlikely that the NFL could prove contributory negligence. For
players entering the NFL today, however, both assumption of
risk and contributory negligence arguments might bar future
lawsuits, since much more information is becoming known and
available to current and future professional football players.
However, even if the plaintiffs here survive these defenses,
proving the NFL caused the plaintiffs’ injuries will require some
creativity, as a wide variety of factors outside of professional
football contribute to the long-term illnesses at issue.

B. The Loss of Chance Doctrine as a Basis for Proving
Causation
Outside of the NFL concussion litigation context, proving that
any one actor caused an illness is extremely difficult. The process
of evaluating disease causation is “typically multifactorial,” as “a
large constellation of factors and variables coalesce to produce a
particular person’s unique set of illness experiences.”218 It is hard
to find liability where elements such as genetics, upbringing,
personal habits, and environment all play an indeterminate role in
causation, in addition to any tortious activity. This issue is even
more complex for the plaintiffs here, who not only have to prove
the NFL caused neurological injury, but must separate its
negative contributions to players’ health from those of other
levels of football (youth leagues, high school, college, etc.),
genetic predisposition, previous head trauma from accidents
unrelated to sports, and abuse of drugs or alcohol.219
See Kain, supra note 187, at 711–12.
Daniel S. Goldberg, Mild Traumatic Brain Injury, The National
League, and the Manufacture of Doubt: An Ethical, Legal, and Historical
Analysis, 34 J. LEGAL MED. 157, 169 (2013).
219
See Goldfinger Personal Injury Law, NFL Agrees to Pay $765 Million
Settlement for Concussion Class Action Law Suit, TORONTO INJURY LAWYER
217
218

BLOG (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.torontoinjurylawyerblog.com/2013/09/nfl-
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In order to prove causation, the plaintiffs’ lawyers had
intended to use “alternative causation (or ‘multiple-causation’)
theory.”220 Alternative causation theory extends liability when
multiple actors are negligent (for example, the NFL, the NCAA,
and Riddell—the company that manufactures the League’s
helmets), but only one actually caused the harm, and it is
impossible to discern which.221 In the seminal case Summers v.
Tice, two hunters negligently fired their shotguns while hunting
quail, injuring the plaintiff third hunter.222 Though the court could
not determine which defendant actually shot the plaintiff, it found
that both should be found jointly liable.223 Therefore, once the
negligence of the multiple tortfeasors is established, the burden
shifts to each defendant to show they did not cause the plaintiff’s
harm.224 If the defendants cannot meet this burden, both will
become liable under alternative causation theory, even though one
negligent actor may have caused no damage at all.225 In justifying
its decision, the court in Summers noted that defendants typically
have better access to evidence of the actual cause than plaintiffs,
and that placing the burden of proof on plaintiffs would leave
many without remedy.226 Because the “innocent” negligent actor
made it difficult (or impossible) for the plaintiff to prove
causation, “the defendants, rather than the innocent plaintiff,
should bear the loss.”227
As attorney Paul Anderson hypothesized, plaintiffs using
alternative causation will argue that while other actors contributed
agrees-to-pay-765-million-settlement-for-concussion-class-action-law-suit.html.
220
Jared Berman, A Look at the NFL Concussion Litigation: Q & A With
Paul Anderson—Part 2, RULING SPORTS (June 28, 2013, 11:09 AM),
http://rulingsports.com/2013/06/28/a-look-at-the-nfl-concussion-litigation-qawith-paul-anderson-part-2/.
221
Dobbs et al., supra note 202, §193.
222
Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). For another application of
multiple causation theory, see Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co.,
248 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1952).
223
Summers, 199 P.2d at 5.
224
Dobbs et al., supra note 202, §193.
225
226
227

Id.
Summers, 199 P.2d at 4.
Dobbs et al., supra note 202, §193.
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to the plaintiffs’ harm, “[a]s the industry leader, it is appropriate
for the NFL to be held jointly and severally liable for
substantially contributing to the players’ injuries.”228
Unfortunately, alternative causation remains a tenuous strategy
with no guarantee of success, and even Anderson admitted that it
was a “legal stretch.”229 This is in part because successfully
finding alternative causation liability requires the presence of
more than one negligent actor. In this case, “proof that one of the
two actors is negligent simply does not aid the plaintiff at all.”230
In order for concussion plaintiffs to use this theory successfully,
they must be able to show that actors other than the NFL were
also negligent, and in some jurisdictions, must have all tortfeasors
joined as defendants, or show that each defendant created
“qualitatively similar risks of harm.”231
In the alternative, plaintiffs’ counsel may want to argue for an
extension of the “loss of chance” (or “lost chance”) doctrine.232
Used almost exclusively in medical malpractice suits, loss of
chance permits plaintiffs to recover for tortious actions
substantially reducing their chance of survival, even if that chance
was less than fifty percent.233 In Herskovits v. Group Health, the
court found the plaintiff successfully proved causation by showing
the defendant’s failure to diagnose the plaintiff’s lung cancer
substantially reduced the plaintiff’s chance of survival, even
though Herskovits had less than a fifty-percent chance of living
regardless of when the diagnosis was made.234
Use of the lost chance doctrine would mitigate the harshness
of the usual “all or nothing” causation standard,235 and allow
228

Berman, supra note 214 (emphasis in original).

229

Id.

230

Dobbs et al., supra note 202, §193.

231

Id.

Use of the doctrine first arose in the English case, Chaplin v. Hicks,
[1911] 2 K.B. 786 (Eng.).
233
J. Stephen Phillips, The “Lost Chance” Theory of Recovery, 27
COLO. LAW, Nov. 1998, at 85, 85.
234
664 P.2d 474, 487 (Wash. 1983).
235
The traditional standard permitted a recovery only upon a
preponderance of evidence—a fifty-one percent certainty of causation. See
232
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concussion plaintiffs to recover damages even if a plaintiff
endured additional brain trauma outside the scope of their NFL
employment, such as through college football or a car accident.
Though loss of chance doctrine has been applied where
malpractice reduces the plaintiff’s chance of survival (such as a
missed or late diagnosis), courts generally prefer to use this
doctrine when the individual suffered serious harm and partially
contributed to the tortious activity, but the harm may have
occurred absent the malpractice.236
In Wendland v. Sparks, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
“loss of chance of less than 50% is compensable,” where the
defendant doctor failed to perform CPR to resuscitate a patient.237
There, even though the patient had entered cardiorespiratory
arrest and had drawn (what would be) her last breath prior to the
defendant’s negligence, the court found the doctor liable for his
failure to attempt resuscitation.238 Noting that the patient had been
successfully resuscitated multiple times prior, the fact that the
patient never made a “no code” request,239 and that the doctor
acted against the known wishes of the patient’s husband, the court
found that even though “the chances of successful resuscitation
were questionable, and any recovery for wrongful death would be
severely limited . . . even a small chance of survival is worth
something.”240 The loss of chance has been likened to the loss of
a lottery ticket—although the ticket “represents a less than even
chance of recovery,” the ticket nonetheless has “clear market
value.”241 In the concussion litigation context, the “ticket”
represents someone who have may have suffered from a
concussion outside of the NFL but nonetheless might have been
healthy—or at least healthier—had the NFL not withheld
information and opposed reform, leading to even more
concussions and neurological injuries.
Kaufman, supra note 35.
236
Phillips, supra note 228, at 85.
237
574 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Iowa 1998).
238
Id. at 328.
239
Essentially, this is a “do not resuscitate” request.
240
Id. at 328, 332 (emphasis in original).
241
Kaufman, supra note 35.
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With the loss of chance doctrine gaining traction in a number
of state courts,242 the same policy reasons behind its acceptance
support an expansion of the doctrine to other claims, and
specifically, to concussion lawsuits. Loss of chance is not
confined to suits dealing with negligent diagnoses and has been
accepted for claims outside the malpractice context, albeit in
narrow circumstances.243 A number of scholars have advocated
for a limited extension of the doctrine to tort cases more
broadly,244 arguing for the increased use of “probabilistic
causation,” where tortfeasors are liable in proportion to the harm
contributed, especially in mass tort contexts.245 Professor Glen O.
Robinson noted the “lagged effects” of harm in toxic tort cases
(an issue applicable to concussion litigation, where the long-term
effects of traumatic brain injuries often arise years later), and
posited that the search for “deterministic causes” (such as
“substantial factor” or “but for” causation) was “both artificial
and misleading,” arguing that “the basic objectives of tort law are
better served if liability is based on risk of injury, than if it is
based on the actual occurrence of a harm.246 Even a “narrow”
formulation of loss of chance, limiting the doctrine to “failure[s]
to protect a person from a preexisting condition,” may permit
recovery for concussion plaintiffs’ failure to warn claims, as
failures to diagnose—like failures to warn—deal with “protection

See Paul Speaker, The Application of the Loss of Chance Doctrine in
Class Actions, 21 REV. LITIG. 345, 346 (2002).
243
Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 332 (Iowa 1998). See, e.g.,
242

Gardner v. Nat’l Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962) (where
defendants were liable for a reduction in a deceased seaman’s chance of
survival after failing to search for him); Hake v. Manchester Twp., 486 A.2d
836 (N.J. 1985) (where defendants were liable for reduction in the chance of
survival of deceased juvenile arrestee who had attempted suicide, by failing to
perform CPR).
244
Fischer, supra note 38, at 606.
245
See, e.g., John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive
Rule to Apportion Tort Damages Based on Probability, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1063
(1989); Glen O. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for
Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985).
246
Robinson, supra note 239, at 780–81, 783.
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against an external risk.”247
One prevailing policy justification for extending loss of
chance doctrine is fairness.248 This argument has particular force
in the concussion litigation context, where a traditional causation
rule might bar concussion plaintiffs from recovery. Due to the
harshness of the traditional “more-likely-than-not” causation
standard, some advocate for loss of chance under fairness
principles, where wrongful conduct not only increased the
incidence of a future illness, but prevented a determination of
whether the illness would have occurred “but for” the
wrongdoing.249 This rationale applies to the concussion litigation
context, where the alleged misrepresentations and omissions of
the NFL and MTBIC may have increased the likelihood of longterm neurological injury by failing to properly address concussion
concerns, and spreading misinformation, causing players to
misjudge the risks involved. In addition, the possibility that the
League intentionally concealed evidence about the seriousness of
concussion injuries makes causation difficult to prove: how do we
know if the plaintiffs’ long-term injuries would have occurred
absent the NFL’s and the MTBIC’s alleged deception?
Deterrence is another popular policy justification for the
extension of loss of chance to concussion litigation.250 The use of
loss of chance prevents tortfeasors who have caused less than
fifty percent of the plaintiff’s harm from escaping liability. By
contrast, a more traditional rule incentivizes potential defendants
who might substantially contribute to an injury, but not
necessarily “more-likely-than-not” have caused it, to avoid
additional precautions.251 For example, under a traditional
causation rule, a player who received four concussions in college
Fischer, supra note 38, at 606, 610.
Id. at 626–27.
249
Loss of chance should also be limited to cases where the duty owed by
the defendant arose from a “special relationship,” a standard the NFL
litigation likely satisfies. Joseph H. King, Jr., “Reduction of Likelihood”
Reformulation and Other Retrofitting of the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 28 U.
MEM. L. REV. 491, 535 (1998).
250
Fischer, supra note 38, at 627–35.
251
Id. at 605–06, 632.
247
248
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and two in the NFL could not argue the League caused more than
fifty percent of his concussion-related injuries. Loss of chance
allows him to argue that the NFL should still be liable for a third
of the injury because it reduced his chances of survival or of
living a healthy life.
Though opponents of this rationale argue that the traditional
more-likely-than-not rule actually incentivizes actors to take
additional steps because they may be liable for more harm than
they actually caused,252 this argument does not have as much
force in the concussion litigation context, where it is more
difficult to prove the NFL caused a majority of the alleged
injuries. Still, a substantial number of states decline to use loss of
chance at all, let alone an expansive application.253 The primary
concern is that an extension of loss of chance will be highly
difficult to limit. Because an extension of loss of chance “can
apply to all cases where a tortfeasor creates a risk of harm and it
is uncertain whether the harm has already occurred or will occur
in the future,” there is fear that the loss of chance would
“swallow the [traditional all-or-nothing] rule,” rather than remain
the exception.254 Such jurisdictions fear that permitting loss of
chance recovery allows the compensation of speculative or
uncertain injuries. Therefore, a significant number of
jurisdictions refuse to consider loss of chance when the victim
had less than a fifty percent chance of survival,255 which would be
problematic for concussion plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court of Florida rejected loss of chance in
Gooding v. University Hospital Building, Inc., concerned that
“[r]elaxing the causation requirement might . . . create an
injustice. Health care providers could find themselves defending
cases simply because a patient fails to improve or where serious
disease processes are not arrested because another course of
action could possibly bring a better result.”256 This argument is
Id. at 627–28.
Alice Férot, The Theory of Loss of Chance: Between Reticence and
Acceptance, 8 FIU L. REV. 591, 611 (2013).
254
Fischer, supra note 38, at 606–07.
255
Férot, supra note 248, at 611–12.
252
253

256

445 So. 2d 1015, 1019–20 (Fla. 1984).
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problematic, however, as loss of chance does not create a
“heightened duty” for all actors, but instead seeks to hold
negligent tortfeasors liable for the reduction in a victim’s chance
of recover.257 Nonetheless, many state courts remain concerned
that innocent parties could ultimately become liable for injuries
they didn’t clearly cause. In its Restatement (Third) of Torts, the
American Law Institute stated it would not take a stance on loss
of chance, noting that it would be a “drastic” expansion of
traditional doctrine and left the issue to state courts.258
While loss of chance has been traditionally used only in
individual suits, this doctrine should be applied here should future
NFL concussion plaintiffs be certified as a class.259 There are
compelling justifications for applying the loss of chance doctrine
to class actions. In addition, loss of chance can actually facilitate
class certification260 for former NFL class action plaintiffs, as it
may increase the chance of satisfying the certification
“commonality” requirement under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b).261 Loss of chance has the capacity to “smooth
over many of the differences” between individual class members
by comparing them all to a “baseline in order to determine
damages” (for example, the incidence of brain injury in non-NFL
playing football players), and then applying those damages prorata to all members of the class.262 Without the use of the relevant
baseline in loss of chance determinations, courts would have to
examine class members on an individual basis to determine the
likelihood of injury absent the tortious behavior, a process that
would lead to a wide variety of results that would likely “destroy

Férot, supra note 247, at 615.
Tory A. Weigand, Lost Chances, Felt Necessities, and the Tale of
Two Cities, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 327, 352 (2010).
259
See generally Speaker, supra note 236, at 349. Professor Speaker
argues that class action lawsuits are not only appropriate for the application of
loss of chance, but are actually a “better fit” for the doctrine than individual
claims. Id. at 353–54.
260
Id. at 366–68.
261
See Scheuerman, supra note 33, at 104.
262
See Speaker, supra note 236, at 365–68.
257
258
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the commonality holding a potential class together.”263
Loss of chance, then, seems like a potentially viable alternate
basis to alternative causation theory and will allow former NFL
players to plead sufficient causation, despite the existence of
other contributing factors. Though any extension of the loss of
chance doctrine should be crafted with care,264 loss of chance is
supported by principles of fairness and deterrence, and it provides
an opportunity for former players to recover despite the role of
other potential causes. Finally, loss of chance may aid in the class
certification context by providing a baseline by which courts can
apportion damages with less reference to the individualized
concerns of specific plaintiffs.
V. CONCLUSION
The proposed settlement between the NFL and over 4,500
former football players is currently an insufficient remedy to the
extensive damage caused by the League’s inaction, failure to
warn, and spread of misinformation, with regard to concussions
and repeated brain trauma. While the potential settlement could
provide some immediate aid to former players suffering from the
most serious effects of repeated head trauma, the amount itself
will likely be inadequate compensation for most players. Further,
the proposed settlement allows the NFL to avoid the discovery
process and any admission of wrongdoing, allowing the NFL to
escape a good deal of bad publicity and public pressure to
reform. It is due to these terms that the proposed settlement is
inadequate and therefore should be denied.
Given the proposed settlement’s insufficiencies, the plaintiffs
may need to opt out and pursue litigation to receive adequate
263
264

Id. at 367.

The concern is that an extension of loss of chance will be highly
difficult to limit. Because an extension of loss of chance “can apply to all cases
where a tortfeasor creates a risk of harm and it is uncertain whether the harm
has already occurred or will occur in the future,” there is fear that the loss of
chance would “swallow the rule,” rather than remain the exception, “with
probabilistic causation completely supplanting the traditional” all-or-nothing
rule. Fischer, supra note 38, at 606–07.
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damages, unless the settlement is significantly reworked. In order
for future plaintiffs to be successful they will need to be able to
argue that section 301 of the LRMA did not preempt their claims.
It is likely plaintiffs would avoid preemption, since the League—
through its creation of the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury
Committee—assumed a duty of care that is independent of the
NFL-NFLPA’s collective bargaining agreement. Unlike
precedent cases such as Duerson and Williams, the plaintiffs’
claims in In re National Football League Players’ Concussion
Injury Litigation arise under a duty of care completely
independent of the NFL-NFLPA collective bargaining agreement.
Nor can the NFL rely on Stringer, as the plaintiffs here do not
reference or implicate the duties of team trainers. While the
plaintiffs’ claims may be “related” to the CBA, resolving them
would not be “dependent on” or “intertwined with” the
bargaining agreement’s interpretation, as Judge Perry recently
found in Green v. Arizona Cardinals.
Proving causation will be more difficult. Current and future
plaintiffs should be able to overcome potential defenses of
assumption of risk and contributory negligence. While athletes
knew they risked concussions, it was nearly impossible for them
to fully appreciate this risk, given the NFL’s obstinacy in failing
to take such injuries seriously and fighting the increasing weight
of science in order to preserve its own image. While some
players may have hid (and still hide) concussions from their
teams, the desire to do so was borne largely from the tough-it-out
culture that the NFL deliberately crafted. By successfully arguing
for an expansion of the loss of chance doctrine, NFL concussion
litigation plaintiffs may find a pathway to adequate recovery for
the harm allegedly caused by the NFL’s negligence and
seemingly active spread of misinformation, despite multiple
factors potentially contributing to long-term cognitive illness and
injury. As Pro Football Hall of Famer Frank Gifford stated in
1960, “Pro football is like nuclear warfare. There are no
winners, only survivors.”265 Unfortunately, for many of those
Events and Discoveries of the Week, SI VAULT (July 4, 1960),
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1071473/1/
265
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survivors suffering from devastating illnesses, such as CTE,
ALS, Alzheimer’s, dementia, and Parkinson’s Disease, the war
continues.
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